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THE SIGNALING VALUE OF LAW REVIEWS: 
AN EXPLORATION OF CITATIONS AND PRESTIGE 
ALFRED L. BROPHY∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 This brief Essay reports a study of citations to every article pub-
lished in 1992 in thirteen leading law journals. It uses citations as a 
proxy (an admittedly poor one) of article quality and then compares 
the citations across journals. There are, not surprisingly, vast differ-
ences in the number of citations per article. While articles in the most 
elite journals receive more citations on average than the other less 
elite (but still highly regarded) journals studied, some articles in the 
less elite journals are more heavily cited than many articles in even 
the most elite journals. In keeping with studies in other disciplines 
and other citation studies of legal journals, the results here suggest 
that we should be wary of judgments about quality based on place of 
publication. We should also be wary of judgments about quality of 
scholarship based on the number of citations, and we should, there-
fore, continue to evaluate scholarship through close reads of it. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Once LexisNexis and Westlaw started putting full texts of law reviews 
on their databases, the authority of print started to recede, leaving the 
authority of the publisher and, to a lesser extent, the authority of li-
mited access. A lot of law professors these days never actually handle 
original physical copies of law review articles, unless they’re stuffing 
envelopes with reprints to send out to colleagues. The patois of the 
professoriate long ago started to refer to placement of an article simply 
by the school name, that is, by the authority of the brand. “I’m pub-
lishing in NYU,” or “I’m publishing in Florida State,” is a perfectly 
comprehensible statement among legal scholars. 
— Michael J. Madison1 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗. Reef C. Ivey, II, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I would like to 
thank Joseph Sherman for excellent research assistance and advice and Daniel M. Filler, 
Michael Madison, Daniel Markel, Deana A. Pollard, and Danny Sokol for advice. 
 1. The Idea of the Law Review: Scholarship, Prestige and Open Access, 10 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 901, 916-17 (2006). 
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 The legal academy’s obsession with law reviews continues. It may 
even be growing.2 We have extensive discussion of everything from 
how to place an article3 to how to rank law journals (and the implica-
tions for rankings of law schools).4 Every spring, faculty blogs light 
up with discussion of when journal editorial boards turn over and the 
best time to submit articles.5 There are legendary stories about what 
one might call “the law of the jungle,” as faculty try to “trade up”—
that is, get an offer from a “better” law journal than the ones from 
which they currently have offers. Faculty members rescind accep-
tances, while students fail to respond to expedite requests or string 
faculty along, asking for more time with virtual promises of accep-
tance. And law review editors exercise enormous (perceived) power 
over the process, even over the form of scholarship. When many of the 
leading law reviews agreed in 2005 to limit the size of articles they 
published,6 there was an immediate shift in the behavior of authors.7 
II.   FRAMING QUESTIONS ABOUT CITATIONS TO LAW REVIEW ARTICLES 
 Much of the obsession rests on an assumption that there are bet-
ter reviews and that it is desirable to publish in a better review than 
a worse one. For purposes of career promotion, there is likely truth to 
this. For purposes of job placement and pay increases, it is not un-
reasonable to assume that articles placed in more prominent journals 
are more useful, as a general matter, than articles placed in less 
prominent journals. In fact, some schools are reputed to pay bonuses 
for articles placed in highly regarded journals. This is because evalu-
ators use journal placement as a proxy for article quality. And in the 
world of law reviews, where there is precious little turf in the more 
prominent law reviews, this likely makes sense. But this rests on an 
                                                                                                                     
 2. At least there is a sense that the difficulty of placing articles at top law reviews 
may be growing. See Posting of Gordon Smith to The Conglomerate, Just Curious About 
Law Review Rejection Rates, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007/03/just_curious_ab.html 
(Mar. 21, 2007). 
 3. Posting of Dave Hoffman to Concurring Opinions, Law Review Submissions, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/07/law_review_subm.html (July 17, 
2006, 23:00). 
 4. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, The Emerging Importance of Law Review Rankings for 
Law School Rankings, 2003-2007, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 35, 35-36 (2007); Ronen Perry, The 
Relative Value of American Law Reviews: Refinement and Implementation, 39 CONN. L. 
REV. 1, 28-32 (2006). 
 5. See, e.g., Posting of Dave Hoffman to Concurring Opinions, Is the Window Open? 
February Law Review Submission Season Notice Board, http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2009/02/is_the_window_o.html (Feb. 5, 2009, 22:52). 
 6. Joint Statement Regarding Articles Length, available at 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/PDF/articles_length_policy.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009). 
 7. Posting of Matt Bodie to PrawfsBlawg, Article Length Limits: Some Early Re-
sults, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/07/article_length_.html (July 24, 
2006, 08:05) (concluding from a study of law reviews that the new policy had the effect of 
reducing the length of articles). 
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assumption that students are good at selecting articles and, thus, the 
meritorious articles are the ones that end up in high-status journals. 
One common complaint among faculty is that the students are, well, 
rather poorly equipped for this task.8 It really is extraordinary that 
students pick articles in areas in which they have little expertise. 
One solution is to ask faculty for assistance, and I suspect that this is 
done with increasing frequency. As faculty and administrators be-
come increasingly concerned with their schools’ reviews, perhaps this 
will become the norm. At the Alabama Law Review, for instance, all 
acceptances of articles must be approved by a faculty member. And 
working as the faculty advisor in recent years has reminded me just 
how difficult it is to select good articles. Although I have read a lot of 
legal scholarship over the years, it is hard (if not impossible) for me 
to competently evaluate articles in areas outside of my areas of 
teaching and research. For this, we rely heavily upon other faculty 
members. This, at a minimum, ensures a minimum quality of ar-
ticles. Obviously flawed pieces are screened out. However, really me-
ritorious pieces may still not receive the attention (or offer) they  
are due. 
 One student editor at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
in a moment of candor, has acknowledged the difficulties students 
face in evaluating submissions. She goes on, however, to state that 
students are capable of making good choices (even if not the best 
choices) and that good choices are good enough: 
The issue is not whether students are competent to select only the 
“best” articles, but whether student editors are able to determine 
whether a given article meets a basic threshold of validity, thereby 
creating a portfolio of valid articles for dissemination to the legal 
community. . . .  
 . . . . 
[B]ecause the article selection process is complex, anyone young 
and inexperienced will have difficulty with it. The truth is, howev-
er, that article selection is not too difficult a task for law students. 
Deciding whether or not an article is desirable is not an elusive 
process requiring a refined professional judgment, honed through 
years of apprenticeship and experience. It is not even like wine 
tasting or art-gallery visiting, where a certain kind of “taste” or 
“eye” is needed.9 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See James Lindgren, Reforming the American Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1123, 
1123-24 (1995); Richard A. Posner, Against the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, 
at 58. 
 9. Natalie C. Cotton, Comment, The Competence of Students as Editors of Law Re-
views: A Response to Judge Posner, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 951, 959-61 (2006). The Review of 
Litigation referred to it as “an excellent rebuttal of Judge Posner’s article.” See William G. 
Hagans, The Review at 25: Looking to a Bright Future, 25 REV. LITIG. iii, iii n.4 (2006). 
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Ah, wine tasting is different (and apparently more difficult) than ar-
ticle selection. Good to know. That’s certainly worthy of further ex-
ploration at a later date. 
 All of this leads to a question, which scholars in other fields10 have 
been asking as well: are those assessments of an article’s quality as-
sociated with the journal that publishes the article warranted? There 
is a high correlation between citations to a school’s main law journal 
and the school’s US News peer assessment score. So there is a corre-
lation between highly regarded journals and highly regarded law 
schools. But how do those judgments work at the level of an individual 
article? Is place of publication a good proxy for an article’s quality?11 
 Quality is, of course, notoriously difficult to gauge, though we 
have had some serious attempts to define universal and useable 
ways of evaluating it.12 One objective and commonly used—even if 
flawed—way of measuring quality is citation counts.13 The problems 
with citation studies include substantial field biases (some areas, like 
criminal law, intellectual property, and professional responsibility, 
have more people writing in them than others and, hence, are more 
likely to be cited).14 These field biases exist across disciplines, of 
course. Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, writing about geography scholar-
                                                                                                                     
 10. See, e.g., Andrew J. Oswald, An Examination of the Reliability of Prestigious Scho-
larly Journals: Evidence and Implications for Decision-Makers, 74 ECONOMICA 21,  
22 (2007). 
 11. See Dennis J. Callahan & Neal Devins, Law Review Article Placement: Benefit or 
Beauty Prize?, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 374, 375 (2006) (finding that high quality articles are 
cited regardless of the review’s prestige, and poor quality articles, regardless of publication 
placement, are not cited).  
 12. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scho-
larship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 891 (1992). We have also had some serious engagement with 
the issue of whether originality is what we should be striving for anyway. See generally, 
e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 917 (1986) (sug-
gesting “thoughtfulness may be a more important virtue” than originality); Pierre Schlag, 
The Brilliant, the Curious, and the Wrong, 39 STAN. L. REV. 917, 924 (1987) (noting in re-
sponse to Farber that “it is not as if we have an overabundance of [brilliance] to begin 
with” and concluding that “[e]ven if most of Farber’s argument is at best curious, and at 
worst wrong, there is one part that nonetheless remains near brilliant: It is the notion that 
brilliance in law stands in special need of containment and criticism”).  
 13. For an amusing take on citations—and therefore an indictment of them—see J.M. 
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
843 (1996). 
 14. Some of my favorite examples of the field bias in citations come from legal history. 
William W. Fisher’s article on the intersection of religious and political ideology and pro-
tections for private property in the century after our country’s founding is, in my opinion, 
the finest article I have ever read in legal history. See William W. Fisher III, Ideology, Re-
ligion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private Property: 1760-1860, 39 EMORY L.J. 65 
(1990). It has been cited about thirty-three times. This, I suppose, is largely due to the fact 
that there are relatively few people writing in the field of antebellum legal history. To put 
this into context, one might consider that one of Fisher’s intellectual property articles, pub-
lished at about the same time as Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of 
Private Property, has been cited more than six times as often. See William W. Fisher III, 
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988). 
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ship, illustrates the problems: “It is thus reasonable to expect au-
thors in the area of, say, globalisation studies to be more cited than 
their counterparts who specialise in the symbolism of particular arc-
hitectural forms in rural China during the early Ming dynasty.”15 
Another problem is that some works are cited because they summar-
ize basic principles rather than because they are innovative or 
“good.” That is, citations are a measure of popularity of sorts. Yet, 
popularity is not always a measure of quality. As Ian Ayres and Fre-
drick Vars concluded in their 2000 article, “extreme modesty is in or-
der” for citation studies.16 As they point out, citation studies have 
“gossipy and at times tawdry aspect[s].”17 They note that they “are 
drawn to citation rankings—reading and discussing them around the 
water cooler—but [they] are simultaneously repulsed by them.”18 
 Yet, as Ralph Waldo Emerson said in his Lecture on the Times, 
“Everything that is popular, it has been said, deserves the attention 
of the philosopher: and this for the obvious reason, that although it 
may not be of any worth in itself, yet it characterizes the people.”19 
And so this Essay turns to an examination of citations to articles 
published in several leading law journals in 1992. It studies citations 
in the Westlaw journals and law reviews database and its Allcourts 
database to articles (not notes, essays, or book reviews) appearing in 
the Columbia Law Review, Duke Law Journal, Harvard Law Review, 
Hastings Law Journal, Indiana Law Journal, Stanford Law Review, 
Texas Law Review, University of Chicago Law Review, Vanderbilt 
Law Review, Virginia Law Review, Washington and Lee Law Review, 
Wisconsin Law Review, and Yale Law Journal. It proceeds from the 
premise that fifteen years is a sufficient time to gauge how well cited 
an article is likely to be.20 And it compares the citations of articles in 
each of these journals, with the purpose of asking this: how do cita-
tions to individual articles compare? The citation hierarchy of these 
journals has been closely studied; the Harvard Law Review consis-
tently outperforms all other journals, for instance. However, there 
has been less attention paid to the question of how individual articles 
do in each journal. What, for instance, distinguishes the Harvard 
Law Review from the Vanderbilt Law Review and from the Indiana 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Henry Wai-chung Yeung, Deciphering Citations, 34 ENV’T & PLAN. A 2093, 2099 (2002). 
 16. Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite Law 
Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 447 (2000). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  
 19. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Lecture on the Times, in WORKS OF RALPH WALDO 
EMERSON 209, 211 (1880).  
 20. Ayres & Vars, supra note 16, at 436-37 (concluding that high-point of citations of 
articles is in the fourth year and “that half of total citations . . . occurred before the articles 
were 4.61 years old”). Some articles, of course, may continue to be cited for a long time—
and perhaps even begin to collect citations only many years after they appear. 
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Law Journal? Are all of the Harvard articles cited at above-average 
rates, or does Harvard benefit from certain big winners—or some-
thing in between? 
III.   THE IMPERFECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JOURNAL REPUTATION 
AND ARTICLE CITATIONS 
 The results are summarized in Table 1.21 It shows the mean and 
median citations per article in each journal; it also has the citations 
at the extremes.22 Thus, the Harvard Law Review’s most-cited article 
(Kathleen M. Sullivan’s legendary foreword, The Justices of Rules 
and Standards23) garnered nearly 600 citations; its least-cited article 
garnered 50 citations. Indiana Law Journal’s most-cited article, by 
contrast, received sixty-one citations. (Adam J. Hirsch and William 
K.S. Wang’s A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand24 is a wills ar-
ticle, where citations are notoriously hard to come by, no less!) Thus, 
while some of the Harvard Law Review’s articles are huge winners of 
citations, some of the articles in highly desirable (but still less 
sought-after) journals are more heavily cited. In fact, Hirsch and 
Wang overperformed the median at both the Vanderbilt Law Review 
and the Texas Law Review. And, as noted earlier, this is particularly 
impressive given that they are writing in the field of wills, a field in 
which relatively few people work and, thus, where it is particularly 
hard to win citations.  
 The most-cited articles in many other journals also significantly 
outperformed many articles in the most elite journals. For example, 
John H. Jackson’s World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: 
Congruence or Conflict?,25 in the Washington and Lee Law Review, 
received 159 citations; Jana B. Singer’s The Privatization of Family 
Law,26 in the Wisconsin Law Review, received 165 citations; and Jo-
seph Sanders’ The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle 
of Mass Torts,27 in the Hastings Law Journal, received 139 citations. 
                                                                                                                     
 21. See infra p. 239.  
 22. See infra p. 239. 
 23. 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). Sullivan’s foreword was particularly successful, even 
as forewords to the Harvard Law Review’s Supreme Court issue go. Guido Calabresi wrote 
the foreword the year before. Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitu-
tional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80 
(1991). It has received 146 citations. Morton J. Horwitz wrote the foreword the next year. 
Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without 
Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30 (1993). It has received 177 citations. 
 24. 68 IND. L.J. 1 (1992). 
 25. 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992). 
 26. 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443. 
 27. 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992). 
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 Louis Kaplow’s Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis28 
was the second most cited of all articles with 454 citations. Mean-
while, there are some other notable outliers. For instance, the most-
cited article in the Vanderbilt Law Review had more than 300 cita-
tions, which gave it more citations than every other article studied 
except for five: Sullivan’s The Justices of Rules and Standards (572 
citations); Kaplow’s Rules Versus Standards, mentioned earlier in 
this paragraph (454 citations); Daniel J. Freed’s Federal Sentencing 
in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of 
Sentencers29 (363 citations), in the Yale Law Journal; Michael W. 
McConnell’s Religious Freedom at a Crossroads30 (345 citations), in 
the University of Chicago Law Review; and Akhil Reed Amar’s The 
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment31 (328 citations), in the 
Yale Law Journal. Vanderbilt Law Review’s most-cited article was 
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey’s Quasi-Constitutional Law: 
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking,32 which ap-
peared as part of the Vanderbilt Law Review’s symposium on the 
reevaluation of canons of statutory interpretation. That symposium 
included other well-cited articles, including the following: Daniel A. 
Farber’s The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, 
and the Rule of Law33 (131 citations); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoff-
rey P. Miller’s The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial 
Preferences34 (69 citations); and Stephen F. Ross’s Where Have You 
Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to 
You?35 (67 citations). 
 Another perspective on this appears in Figure 1, which graphs the 
citations by journals to each article in each journal studied here.36 
One striking thing is the maldistribution of “wealth,” as it were. 
There are some real winners: Reva Siegel’s Reasoning from the Body: 
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of 
Equal Protection37 (181 citations) (the Stanford Law Review’s most-
cited); Douglas Laycock’s Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial 
States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law38 (201 cita-
tions) (the Columbia Law Review’s most-cited); Wendy J. Gordon’s 
On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary 
                                                                                                                     
 28. 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
 29. 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992). 
 30. 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992). 
 31. 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992). 
 32. 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992). 
 33. 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992). 
 34. 45 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1992). 
 35. 45 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1992). 
 36. See infra p. 240. 
 37. 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992). 
 38. 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992). 
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Impulse39 (199 citations) (the Virginia Law Review’s most-cited); and 
Lawrence E. Mitchell’s A Theoretical and Practical Framework for 
Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes40 (152 citations) (the Tex-
as Law Review’s most-cited). 
 There were some other huge citation winners. A number of other 
articles with more than 190 citations included the following: Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk’s Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Lim-
its on State Competition in Corporate Law41 (298 citations), in the 
Harvard Law Review; Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig’s 
The Untenable Case for Chapter 1142 (244 citations), in the Yale Law 
Journal; Steven G. Calabresi and Kevin H. Rhodes’ The Structural 
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary43 (224 citations), in 
the Harvard Law Review; Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner’s Strategic 
Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules44 (206 
citations), in the Yale Law Journal; Mark Seidenfeld’s A Civic Re-
publican Justification for the Bureaucratic State45 (203 citations), in 
the Harvard Law Review; and Randy E. Barnett’s The Sound of Si-
lence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent46 (194 citations), in the 
Virginia Law Review. 
 Table 2 presents the data in a somewhat different format.47 It 
presents the raw data for each article in each journal, ranked from 
highest in citations to lowest. This facilitates comparison across 
journals. Some immediate observations jump out. Except for the 
Harvard Law Review’s most-cited article, the Yale Law Journal had 
more citations for all other articles (as ranked two through eleven by 
numbers of citations) than did the Harvard Law Review. The same is 
true for the Columbia Law Review for articles ranked six through 
eleven. 
 Certainly, articles in the Harvard Law Review and the Yale Law 
Journal and a few other journals win lots and lots of citations. The 
median article in the Yale Law Journal in 1992 has nearly 200 cita-
tions. But what is important—and perhaps surprising—is that many 
articles are not much more heavily cited in the leading, elite journals 
than in the still very strong, but less elite. So I am led to a few im-
portant, sobering conclusions. There are some articles that are ama-
zingly well cited and (on the assumption here) influential. Yet, then 
there are many articles, even in elite journals, that are not nearly so 
                                                                                                                     
 39. 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992). 
 40. 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992). 
 41. 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992). 
 42. 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992). 
 43. 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992). 
 44. 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992). 
 45. 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992). 
 46. 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992). 
 47. See infra p. 241. 
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well cited and that are (in terms of citations) not distinguishable 
from many, many other articles. This suggests an even further need 
for caution in measuring articles by their placement. 
 Table 3 presents data on citations to the articles by courts.48 In 
keeping with recent discussions of the declining importance of law 
reviews to courts, there are substantially fewer citations to the ar-
ticles by courts than by journals. The most heavily cited article has 
forty-two citations; yet, the modal citation is zero. Even the median 
citations of articles by courts in some of the journals is zero. Table 4 
presents data on citations to each article in each journal under  
study here.49 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 Given the limited number of articles under study here and the 
small window of time they were published (1992), it is certainly poss-
ible that temporary aberrations skew the results. However, there is 
some evidence from other citation studies that provides some rein-
forcement for these findings. For instance, Kincaid Brown reviewed 
fourteen citation studies published between 1930 and 2002.50 Most of 
those studied citations by journals, although a few involved case cita-
tions by the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals. Brown 
ranked law reviews by number of citations in each study and then 
averaged the ranks to obtain an overall rank for each law review.51 
Spearman’s rank-order correlation between Brown’s average rank for 
the thirteen law reviews in the present study and the law review 
                                                                                                                     
 48. See infra p. 242. 
 49. See infra p. 243. 
 50. Kincaid C. Brown, How Many Copies Are Enough? Using Citation Studies to Limit 
Journal Holdings, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 301 (2002). 
 51. Id. Brown’s overall citation rank of the thirteen law reviews in the present study 
is as follows: 
 1. HARV. L. REV. 
 2. YALE L.J. 
 3. COLUM. L. REV.  
 4. U. CHI. L. REV.  
 6. VA. L. REV.  
 8. STAN. L. REV.  
 11. TEX. L. REV.  
 15. DUKE L.J.  
 16. VAND. L. REV.  
 20. WIS. L. REV.  
 22. HASTINGS L.J.  
 37. IND. L.J. 
 58. WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
Id. at 310-12.  
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rank of the most-cited article by publications is 0.71 (p = 0.01).52 The 
Spearman correlations between Brown’s average rank and the mean 
and median citations to the thirteen law reviews by publications are 
larger: -0.90 and -0.92, respectively (p < 0.0001 for both). The larger 
correlations are consistent with the greater representativeness of the 
mean and median in comparison with the single most-cited article in 
each law review. Citation ranks of law reviews in this study can also 
be compared with John Doyle’s findings on citations for 1995 through 
2002.53 Spearman correlations between Doyle’s ranks and ranks for 
most-cited article, mean, and median for the thirteen law reviews in 
the present study are 0.52, -0.79, and -0.84, respectively (p = 0.07, 
0.002, and 0.0004, respectively). The Spearman correlation between 
Brown’s and Doyle’s citation ranks for the thirteen law reviews is 
0.92 (p < 0.0001), indicating that the two sets of ranks are very simi-
lar despite their differences in time frames and suggesting once 
again the stability of such criteria. 
 “Extreme modesty,”54 of course, is in order in interpreting these 
results, but so, too, may be a conclusion drawn about the quality of a 
piece simply by its location of publication.55 Placement in one of the 
most elite journals may not signal that an article will be cited–
although the articles in the two most elite journals, the Harvard Law 
Review and the Yale Law Journal were heavily cited, by and large. 
And some articles in a very respectable, but not quite elite journal 
(like the Indiana Law Journal) are cited more frequently than ar-
ticles in even the most elite journals. This is further evidence of the 
limitations of using placement as a proxy for quality. In evaluating 
scholarship, we must continue to read it rather than rely upon prox-
ies, such as placement (or citations).56 
                                                                                                                     
 52. The Spearman correlation coefficient is a measure of correlation between two 
sets of ranks. GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 193-
95 (8th ed. 1989). 
 53. Doyle’s data are available at Washington and Lee University School of Law, Law 
Journals: Submissions and Ranking, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ (last visited Apr. 11, 2009). I 
report changes in Doyle’s rankings from 2002 to 2005 in Brophy, supra note 4, at 64-68. 
 54. Ayres & Vars, supra note 16, at 447. 
 55. The findings here match Callahan and Devins’s conclusion that “meritorious ar-
ticles will be cited regardless of the prestige of the review in which they appear, and poor 
articles, even those published in high-tier reviews, will be ignored.” Callahan & Devins, 
supra note 11, at 375. As Callahan and Devins address, the citations pattern suggests that 
quality (or at least utility) of articles may be fairly flat. Id. And it is yet another reminder, 
as if any is needed, that good work is being done (and published) throughout the legal 
academy. See Alfred L. Brophy, The Relationship Between Law Review Citations and Law 
School Rankings, 39 CONN. L. REV. 43, 51 n.25 (2006). 
 56. Of course, at some point I would like to have a more rigorous, empirical study of 
the judgments based on reading of scholarship. My experience with the peer review 
process, as both a referee and a recipient of peer reports, suggests that, while some judg-
ments are fairly stable across readers, there are other judgments that vary rather widely. 
And even in nonanonymous peer reviews—like signed book reviews—we see rather wide 
variance of judgments. One might take, for instance, the recent discussion of Robin Ein-
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TABLE 1: CITATIONS IN LEGAL PERIODICALS TO ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN 
SELECTED LAW REVIEWS IN 1992 
LAW  
REVIEW 
RANK* MEAN STD. 
DEV. 
MIN. 25TH
%ILE 
MEDIAN 75TH
%ILE 
MAX. N
Chicago 3 91.31 77.40 8 52.75 81.5 104.50 337 16 
Columbia 7 101.44 56.27 8 40.50 96.5 147.50 196 18 
Duke 2 114.33 129.69 15 40.50 58.0 142.25 451 12 
Harvard 1 179.00 159.36 44 66.00 88.0 270.00 571 11 
Hastings 12 46.79 27.14 13 24.50 44.0 65.00 138 29 
Indiana 13 25.15 16.24 6 10.50 24.0 36.00 60 13 
Stanford 8 70.62 43.88 12 37.50 62.0 101.00 178 13 
Texas 11 56.29 41.68 9 29.00 38.0 78.50 151 17 
Vanderbilt 5 62.42 63.99 6 34.00 51.0 67.00 302 19 
Virginia 6 76.31 54.16 16 37.25 57.5 97.75 197 16 
Washington 
& Lee 10 36.76 42.76 3 8.50 18.0 57.00 159 17 
Wisconsin 9 39.94 45.40 1 13.50 30.0 44.50 165 17 
Yale 4 174.38 105.58 25 69.50 185.0 280.00 321 13 
 * Rank is based on number of journal citations to most-cited article in each law review.  
                                                                                                                     
horn’s American Taxation, American Slavery as an example here. ROBIN L. EINHORN, 
AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY (2006). She received a glowing review in the 
American Historical Review. Loren Schweninger, Book Review, 112 AM. HIST. REV. 193 
(2007). She also received quite positive reviews in The Journal of American History (Stan-
ley L. Engerman, Book Review, 93 J. AM. HIST. 1209-10 (2007)), Enterprise and Society 
(Douglas R. Engerton, Book Review, 7 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y. 837-38 (2006)), and the Law 
and History Review (Ajay K. Mehrotra, Book Review, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 206-08 (2008)). 
However, Gordon S. Wood’s review in New York Review of Books (54 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
June 28, 2007) was quite critical. A critical review—particularly in such an important ve-
nue as the New York Review of Books—may testify to the importance of the book. But we 
see widely varying evaluations of quality, even among the leading figures in the field.  
 Or, to take another example from legal scholarship, Michael J. Klarman’s From Jim 
Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (2004) won 
the prestigious Bancroft Prize in American history. Press Release, Columbia University 
Libraries, Columbia Announces 2005 Bancroft Prize Winners (Mar. 16, 2005), 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/news/libraries/2005/2005-03-16.bancroft_winners.html. 
Still, Klarman’s book has also been the subject of sustained challenges in leading law re-
views. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights Recon-
sidered, 114 YALE L.J. 591 (2004) (book review); Mary L. Dudziak, The Court and Social 
Context in Civil Rights History, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2005) (book review); Paul Finkel-
man, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973 (2005) 
(book review). This is further illustration of the variance of expert judgments, even on  
monumental works. 
 We may, of course, recognize that a book is important, even if we disagree with its 
thesis. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Reason and Sentiment: The Moral Worlds and Modes of 
Reasoning of Antebellum Jurists, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1161 (1999) (reviewing PETER KARSTEN, 
HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1997)). 
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FIGURE 1: JOURNAL CITATIONS PER ARTICLE IN SELECTED LAW REVIEWS 
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TABLE 2: TOTAL CITATIONS IN LEGAL PERIODICALS AND BY COURTS PER 
ARTICLE IN SELECTED LAW REVIEWS, 1992 
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1 572 454 363 345 310 201 199 181 165 159 152 139 60 
2 297 289 328 181 131 188 193 118 145 108 149 86 46 
3 274 171 326 120 80 167 118 110 59 74 94 75 43 
4 226 95 243 107 69 158 102 98 48 64 86 74 29 
5 202 88 205 100 67 158 91 77 41 50 71 70 29 
6 94 60 196 86 61 141 87 66 35 35 55 68 25 
7 82 57 191 84 59 129 74 62 33 27 52 65 24 
8 79 53 163 82 54 129 60 60 31 20 44 65 19 
9 67 48 121 81 53 98 55 58 30 18 42 57 17 
10 58 38 74 67 51 97 49 51 24 18 38 56 11 
11 49 26 70 63 44 95 43 27 17 14 37 50 10 
12 . 15 43 61 42 87 42 27 16 11 36 50 10 
13 . . 26 50 38 83 38 13 16 10 35 50 7 
14 . . . 31 38 42 34 . 14 7 28 50 . 
15 . . . 13 37 41 29 . 12 5 28 45 . 
16 . . . 8 28 41 16 . 5 5 19 44 . 
17 . . . . 22 36 . . 3 3 13 44 . 
18 . . . . 21 8 . . . . . 42 . 
19 . . . . 6 . . . . . . 34 . 
20 . . . . . . . . . . . 32 . 
21 . . . . . . . . . . . 26 . 
22 . . . . . . . . . . . 25 . 
23 . . . . . . . . . . . 24 . 
24 . . . . . . . . . . . 24 . 
25 . . . . . . . . . . . 18 . 
26 . . . . . . . . . . . 16 . 
27 . . . . . . . . . . . 15 . 
28 . . . . . . . . . . . 14 . 
29 . . . . . . . . . . . 13 . 
 * Rank of article in terms of number of journal citations within each journal. 
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TABLE 3: CITATIONS BY COURTS TO ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN SELECTED LAW  
REVIEWS IN 1992 
LAW  
REVIEW 
RANK* MEAN STD. 
DEV. 
MIN. 25TH
%ILE 
MEDIAN 75TH
%ILE 
MAX. N
Chicago 7 1.13 2.31 0 0 0.0 1.00 8 16 
Columbia 2 4.06 4.71 0 0 2.5 6.25 13 18 
Duke 4 1.83 3.38 0 0 1.0 2.50 12 12 
Harvard 5 2.82 3.19 0 0 1.0 5.00 10 11 
Hastings 10 0.48 0.99 0 0 0.0 1.00 4 29 
Indiana 12 0.23 0.60 0 0 0.0 0.00 2 13 
Stanford 3 2.31 3.35 0 0 1.0 2.50 12 13 
Texas 8 1.29 2.02 0 0 0.0 2.00 7 17 
Vanderbilt 6 1.32 2.36 0 0 0.0 2.00 8 19 
Virginia 11 0.56 0.81 0 0 0.0 1.00 2 16 
Washington & 
Lee 13 0.18 0.39 0 0 0.0 0.00 1 17 
Wisconsin 9 0.88 1.36 0 0 0.0 1.50 4 17 
Yale 1 6.31 11.16 0 0 4.0 6.50 42 13 
 * Rank is based on number of citations by courts to most-cited article in each law review 
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TABLE 4: CITATIONS BY COURTS PER ARTICLE IN SELECTED LAW REVIEWS, 1992 
AR
TI
CL
E 
RA
N
K
* 
YA
LE
 
CO
LU
M
BI
A 
ST
AN
FO
RD
 
D
U
K
E 
H
AR
VA
RD
 
VA
N
D
ER
BI
LT
 
CH
IC
AG
O
 
TE
XA
S 
W
IS
CO
N
SI
N
 
H
AS
TI
N
G
S 
VI
RG
IN
IA
 
IN
D
IA
N
A 
W
&
L 
1 42 13 12 12 10 8 8 7 4 4 2 2 1
2 9 13 6 3 6 7 5 4 4 3 2 1 1
3 7 12 3 3 5 3 3 4 2 2 2 0 1
4 6 10 2 1 4 2 1 3 2 1 1 0 0
5 6 5 2 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
6 5 5 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
7 4 4 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
8 2 3 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
9 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 1 0 . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 . 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0
15 . 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0
16 . 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0
17 . 0 . . . 0 . 0 0 0 . . 0
18 . 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . .
19 . . . . . 0 . . . 0 . . .
20 . . . . . . . . . 0 . . .
21 . . . . . . . . . 0 . . .
22 . . . . . . . . . 0 . . .
23 . . . . . . . . . 0 . . .
24 . . . . . . . . . 0 . . .
25 . . . . . . . . . 0 . . .
26 . . . . . . . . . 0 . . .
27 . . . . . . . . . 0 . . .
28 . . . . . . . . . 0 . . .
29 . . . . . . . . . 0 . . .
 * Rank of article in terms of number of citations by courts within each journal. 
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